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the morning goes on four, at noon on two, and in the evening on three feet?",
One might well answer: "Rehnquist's separation of powers jurisprudence, as it
is a difficult creature to characterize, arguably evolving over time." 2 In
adolescence, it appeared an originalist on all fours,3 in manhood it walked
erect, a Byron White functionalist,4 and in old age ... well, perhaps the Sphinx
might just devour one after all! Indeed, it is difficult to identify a principle
unifying the late Chief Justice's separation of powers cases.
And how does one explain the absence of any separation of powers
revolution to accompany federalism's rebirth? 5 No separation of powers
opinion ever announced, "We start with first principles."' Unlike federalism,
well-favored and judicially policed by the Federalism Five, the separation of
powers has arguably been neglected (salutarily, some might say). But that
neglect, salutary or not, has been inconsistent. Rehnquist did police (or attempt
to police) the horizontal "parchment barriers" of separation from time to time. 7
What principle explains Rehnquist's philosophy of the separation of powers?
To explain the pattern of his cases, we resort to Rehnquist's first principles
1. 1 T. T. TIMAYENIS, A HISTORY OF GREECE: FROM THE EARLIEST TIMES TO THE
PRESENT 14 (1883).
2. Thus, it has been possible for commentators to describe Rehnquist both as an
"advocate of the strict separation of the powers of the federal government," SUE DAVIS,
JUSTICE REHNQUIST AND THE CONSTITUTION 21 (1989), and, like Justice Byron White, as
adhering to a "more flexible, less rigid approach to the separation of powers." Theodore B.
Olson, Separation of Powers and the Supreme Court: Implications and Possible Trends, 6
ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 261, 276 (1992); see also David C. Vladeck & Alan B. Morrison, The
Roles, Rights, and Responsibilities of the Executive Branch, in THE REHNQUIST COURT:
JUDICIAL ACTIVISM ON THE RIGHT 178 (Herman Schwartz ed., 2002) ("[T]he Rehnquist Court
will not usually tread on power-sharing arrangements between the branches.").
3. See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986) (joining the majority); Am. Textile
Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 543 (1981) (dissenting on nondelegation
grounds); Indus. Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 671 (1980)
(concurring separately, suggesting nondelegation doctrine ought to apply); Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam) (authoring the separation of powers analysis that struck down
the commission); see also infra note 104 (discussing proof that Rehnquist was the author of
Part IV.B of Buckley).
4. See, e.g., Metro. Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for Abatement of Aircraft Noise,
Inc., 501 U.S. 252, 277 (1991) (joining Justice White's dissent); Mistretta v. United States,
488 U.S. 361 (1989) (joining the majority); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988)
(authoring the majority opinion).
5. It is debatable whether or not there was a separation of powers revolution, but the
ascendant view favors the conclusion of "no revolution." Compare Steven G. Calabresi,
Separation of Powers and the Rehnquist Court: The Centrality of Clinton v. City of New
York, 99 Nw. U. L. REV. 77, 85 (2004) (naming Clinton v. City of New York as "the hidden
separation of powers blockbuster of the Rehnquist years"), with M. Elizabeth Magill, The
Revolution that Wasn 't, 99 Nw. U. L. REV. 47 (2004) (concluding there was no revolution),
and Eric R. Clacys, Progressive Political Theory and Separation of Powers on the Burger
and Rehnquist Courts, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 405, 407 (2004) (concluding no revolution).
6. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995) (so announcing for federalism).
7. See THE FEDERALIST No. 48 (James Madison) (introducing the "parchment barriers"
concept); see also cases cited in supra note 3 (demonstrating Rehnquist's lack of policing).
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and our own primary research to suggest Rehnquist was consistent at the most
fundamental level: From his days as a law clerk to Justice Robert Jackson
during Youngstown to his service as the head of the Justice Department's Office
of Legal Counsel (OLC) through his tenure on the Supreme Court, Rehnquist's
separation of powers jurisprudence has been marked by an inductive, common
law approach to constitutional adjudication. It is an approach that eschews
categorical, a priori bright-line rules but favors precedent and the lessons of
history. 8 When Rehnquist believes the constitutional text speaks clearly, he
follows its specific commands. 9 Absent such clarity, though, he would defer to
Congress, "the dominant balancer of public policy in our democratic society,"
and not the courts.10 By that same token, Rehnquist enforced the separation of
powers by forcing Congress to take responsibility for its duty to make public
policy and not impermissibly pass the buck to the executive branch or to the
courts.
I. THE ROOTS OF REHNQUIST'S SEPARATION OF POWERS JURISPRUDENCE
In this Part, we briefly assess the importance of Youngstown, decided
during Rehnquist's clerkship for Justice Jackson, in the development of
Rehnquist's views on the separation of powers. Then, we consider how
Rehnquist approached the separation of powers during his tenure as Assistant
Attorney General in the Office of Legal Counsel in order to evaluate whether
his views have remained constant, such that a consistent principle might
explain the pattern of his judicial decisions.
A. Rehnquist as a Law Clerk for Justice Robert Jackson
Rehnquist's first professional brush with the separation of powers came
soon after the start of his legal career as a junior law clerk to Justice Robert
Jackson. It was an auspicious start. Rehnquist began his clerkship in February
1952, just months prior to the famous Youngstown separation of powers
litigation at the Supreme Court. In June 1950, North Korean troops had invaded
South Korea, and the U.N. Security Council had authorized the use of force to
8. See, e.g., Judicial Reform Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in
Judicial Machinery of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong. 91 (1969) (statement of
William H. Rehnquist, Assistant Attorney General, Department of Justice) ("[P]recedent is
entitled to a great deal of weight, particularly if you take the view that a page of history is
worth a good deal in construing the Constitution.").
9. See R. Randall Kelso, Separation of Powers Doctrine on the Modern Supreme
Court and Four Doctrinal Approaches to Judicial Decision-Making, 20 PEPP. L. REv. 531,
576 (1993) (characterizing such positivist theory as "the Holmesian approach to separation
of powers"). Professor Kelso argues that Rehnquist took at least a moderate Holmesian
approach to separation of powers. Id. at 579.
10. Id. at 578.
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repel the invaders."l President Harry Truman had declared a national
emergency and ordered American troops into combat in a de facto war. 12 In
April 1952, an unresolved labor dispute in the American steel industry risked
widespread strikes and the attendant possibility of shortages in the nation's
wartime steel supply. Significantly, Truman declined to invoke the Taft-Hartley
Act and its procedures for resolving the labor dispute. Instead, Truman issued
an executive order authorizing the Secretary of Commerce to seize the privately
owned and operated steel mills to assure continued steel production. 13 He
predicated the seizure order on his aggregate power as Commander in Chief of
the armed forces and his inherent power as executive.
The steel industry promptly challenged Truman's order in federal district
court, seeking a preliminary injunction against the seizure as a violation of the
separation of powers-an executive acting ultra vires. Judge Pine rejected the
government's broad assertion of executive power and granted the steel industry
its request for a preliminary injunction. 14 The parties' cross-appeals quickly
progressed to the Supreme Court. On May 16, 1952, the Court voted 6-3 in
conference to reject Truman's claim of authority to seize the steel mills.15 As
Justice Jackson described the vote to his then-law clerks William Rehnquist
and C. George Niebank, Jr., "Well boys, the President got licked.' 16
Although Justice Black authored the Youngstown majority opinion for the
Court, 17 it is Justice Jackson's concurrence that has endured, providing a
framework for separation of powers analysis in executive/congressional tugs-
of-war. It is to this concurrence we look for any possible abiding influence on
the law clerk William Rehnquist.
Jackson laid out three "somewhat over-simplified" groups of potential
executive and congressional disputes. 1 In category one, the President acts at
the apex of his power when he is acting "pursuant to an express or implied
authorization of Congress"-i.e., all the power Congress can delegate to the
President plus the power possessed by the President "in his own right."1 9 In
11. Complaint of Aggression upon the Republic of Korea, S.C. Res. 83, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1511 (June 27, 1950).
12. Proclamation No. 2914, 15 Fed. Reg. 9029 (Dec. 19, 1950).
13. Exec. Order No. 10,340, 17 Fed. Reg. 3139 (Apr. 10, 1952).
14. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 103 F. Supp. 569, 577 (D.D.C. 1952).
15. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
16. WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT 186 (rev. ed. 2001).
17. Rehnquist later opined that the separately concurring Justices, even though they
joined Black's opinion, did not fully subscribe to it:
There simply does not seem to have been enough time for the negotiation that often goes on
in order to enable those who disagree with minor parts of a proposed Court opinion, but not
with the result, to effect some sort of compromise that will enable them to join the principal
opinion.
Id. at 187.
18. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring).
19. Id.
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category-two conflicts, the President acts without a congressional grant or
denial of power. This category requires the President to rely on his own
independent power. It is a shadow land, Jackson's "zone of twilight." 20 In
category-three conflicts, Congress has expressed or implied its will, but the
President acts incompatibly.21 Here, the President appears to be at the nadir of
his power, Jackson's "lowest ebb" of presidential power, and must rely on his
own authority "minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the
matter."
22
Jackson's concurrence placed the mill seizure in the least favored camp,
category three.23 Congress had ordained procedures by which the Commander
in Chief could resolve labor disputes and effect seizures of the steel mills, such
as the Taft-Hartley Act, but the congressionally appointed procedures had to be
followed. Truman's order was incompatible with Congress's expressed will,
and his power as Commander in Chief did not give him independent authority
to seize the mills.
What effect did his participation in this case have on the young William
Rehnquist's views of the separation of powers? It has been suggested that
Youngstown may have "cemented" in the young Rehnquist "a pro-Congress
bias in separation of powers cases" that might explain his later votes upholding
creative power-sharing and delegating arrangements in Morrison v. Olson and
24Mistretta. Doubtless, the experience of clerking for Jackson during
Youngstown left an impression on Rehnquist. He often wrote and spoke about
the historic case he witnessed unfold,25 and he later invoked Jackson's
concurrence as the author of the Court's opinion in Dames & Moore,
2 6
elevating its authority from merely that of a concurrence, even if he, quite
arguably, substantially revised Jackson's analysis in the process.
27
Yet, there are good reasons to doubt the suggestion that Youngstown
cemented "a pro-Congress bias" in Rehnquist. First, Jackson's concurrence is
best understood as a mode of analysis, not a precedent dictating a pro-Congress
outcome whenever invoked. By the concurrence's own terms, the three
Youngstown categories are "somewhat over-simplified" classes of conflict
between the President and Congress. As one progresses from one category to
the next, the President shoulders an increasing burden to come forward and
defend his claim that Congress, acting pursuant to its enumerated powers, is
treading on the President's independent, substantive powers (e.g., the
Commander-in-Chief power). To be sure, category three means the President
20. Id. at 637.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 640.
24. Calabresi, supra note 5, at 83-84.
25. See, e.g., REHNQUIST, supra note 16, at 186 (describing the Youngstown litigation).
26. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
27. See infra note 101 and accompanying text.
1739
HeinOnline -- 58 Stan. L. Rev. 1739 2005-2006
STANFORD LAW REVIEW
carries a heavy burden to prevail against Congress. But it was not for executive
power what strict scrutiny was for equal protection jurisprudence: "'strict' in
theory and fatal in fact." 28 Youngstown left an impression on Rehnquist, as it
was a landmark separation of powers decision. It did so, however, as a mode of
analysis and not an outcome.
29
Second, even if one conceived of Jackson's concurrence as a set of
outcomes determined by categorization rather than a mode of analysis, the
documentary record casts doubt on the claim that it cemented in Rehnquist a
pro-Congress bias. To begin, Jackson's law clerks had very little hand in
drafting his opinions generally and little role in preparing the Youngstown
concurrence specifically. 30 Thus, the Youngstown concurrence represented
Jackson's, not Rehnquist's, work product. In fact, archival materials indicate
law clerk Rehnquist suggested alternate non-separation of powers grounds on
which Youngstown might have been resolved. In an apparently unsolicited
memorandum to Justice Jackson, William Rehnquist and his co-clerk proposed
they undertake additional research for Youngstown. Interestingly, all the issues
proposed non-separation of powers grounds for resolving the appeal--e.g., by
balancing equities on the preliminary injunction, etc.3 1
To be sure, the 1952 clerk memorandum, standing by itself, would be a
thin reed to support a claim that Rehnquist had doubts about resolving the
separation of powers question in Youngstown against the President. It might
merely suggest Rehnquist favored the parsimonious adjudication of
constitutional cases by resort to avoidance. The memorandum, however, does
not stand by itself. In his book The Supreme Court, Rehnquist, without
mentioning his prior memorandum, expressed doubts about how Youngstown
28. Cf Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 362 & n.36 (1978) (Brennan,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search
of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86
HARV. L. REv. 1, 8 (1972)).
29. See infra text accompanying notes 96-103.
30. See, e.g., REHNQUIST, supra note 16, at 188 (recalling that Jackson showed
Rehnquist his Youngstown concurrence "in draft form... and asked [him] to find citations
for some of the propositions it contained, but that was about the extent of our participation");
DVD: Roundtable Discussion with Law Clerks of Justice Robert H. Jackson (Robert H.
Jackson Center 2003) (on file with authors) [hereinafter DVD Roundtable Discussion]
(noting it was "quite rare" for Jackson to ask a law clerk to do legal research, but law clerks
"wound up writing most of the footnotes"); see also William H. Rehnquist, Who Writes
Decisions of the Supreme Court?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 13, 1957, at 74 (stating
that Justice Jackson "neither needed nor used ghost writers. The great majority of opinions
which he wrote were drafted originally by him and submitted to his clerks for their criticism
and suggestions").
31. Memorandum from Cornelius George Niebank, Jr., and William H. Rehnquist to
Justice Robert H. Jackson (n.d., prior to May 3, 1952), in THE ROBERT HOUGHWOUT
JACKSON PAPERS, Legal File, 1919-1962, n.d., Box 176, Folder 2, Nos. 744-745 (Library of
Congress). Likely, Jackson never discussed this memorandum with them, as it was not his
practice to confer with his clerks on the grant of certiorari before the Court's conference. See
DVD Roundtable Discussion, supra note 30.
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was resolved. Noting that the separation of powers issue was not well settled,
but in his view "more or less up for grabs," he believed Youngstown might have
been resolved on the balancing of equities and that the law on those issues
favored the executive. 32 Thus, Chief Justice Rehnquist sheds some light on
law-clerk Rehnquist's thinking: Youngstown might have been best resolved on
non-separation of powers grounds, and, in any case, an analysis of the
separation of powers issue did not clearly favor Congress.33 That sentiment
does not suggest Rehnquist was more favorably disposed toward Congress than
the President in the separation of powers, at least not in the context of national
security and foreign affairs.
B. Rehnquist in the Office of Legal Counsel
Following his clerkship, Rehnquist next encountered the separation of
powers with his appointment as Assistant Attorney General for the Office of
Legal Counsel (OLC) in the Justice Department.34 During his tenure there,
Rehnquist handled several matters implicating core questions of the separation
of powers. Before turning to that advice, we consider Rehnquist's conception
of the role OLC played within the executive branch, as that conception itself
gives us some insight into Rehnquist's understanding of the separation of
powers.
1. OLC's role as an institution
At the time Rehnquist headed it, OLC was responsible for preparing the
Attorney General's formal opinions, giving legal opinions to executive branch
agencies and assisting the Attorney General in advising the President.35 In the
discharge of these duties, Rehnquist rejected a "European Ministry of Justice"
model for the Justice Department, in which it would act as a disinterested office
32. REHNQUIST, supra note 16, at 189.
33. For its time, the Court's opinion was a departure from its traditional reluctance to
reach constitutional issues if a case could be resolved on a nonconstitutional ground. MAEVA
MARCUS, TRUMAN AND THE STEEL SEIZURE CASE: THE LIMITS OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER 228
(1994).
34. We skip Rehnquist's intervening private practice of law in Arizona, because he
handled no separation of powers matters during that period, at least not in any reported
cases. His work as private counsel principally consisted of state law matters litigated in
Arizona state court, but he did handle a few matters in federal court. One of them raised
issues of tribal immunity (distantly) analogous to immunities from suit enjoyed by federal
officers. See generally Davis v. Littell, 398 F.2d 83 (9th Cir. 1968) (arguing that the chief
legal officer of a Navajo tribe enjoyed absolute immunity from suit for defamation).
35. 28 C.F.R. § 0.25 (1969). For background on OLC's opinion-writing function, see
Douglas W. Kmiec, OLC's Opinion Writing Function: The Legal Adhesive for a Unitary
Executive, 15 CARDOzo L. REV. 337 (1993); John 0. McGinnis, Models of the Opinion
Function of the Attorney General: A Normative, Descriptive, and Historical Prolegomenon,
15 CARDOZO L. REv. 375 (1993).
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within the executive, exercising its own discretion independent of the
administration's policy objectives. 36 Instead, Rehnquist defended the position
that the Justice Department "is but one of several instrumentalities engaged in
the process of administering justice."37 That is not to say that Rehnquist
countenanced the assertion of any position at all. The Department's position
had to be reasonable in the sense that it was arguable, but the Department did
not have to adopt the position that "would be most restrictive on its
activities."
38
As with the Justice Department generally, Rehnquist viewed his own
bailiwick in OLC within the tradition of a common law adversary system
umpired by the judiciary on a case-by-case basis. For Rehnquist, each branch of
the government had a prerogative to determine for itself in the first instance,
absent a prior "definitive adjudication," "what a constitutional requirement
might mean." 39 Thus, the President, for example, could interpret the scope of
the Constitution's provision of a Commander-in-Chief power.40 But once the
federal judiciary-which for Rehnquist was the "definitive expositor of what
the Constitution requires"-resolved the matter,4 1 that particular issue was off
the table to subsequent, inconsistent, executive or congressional
reinterpretations on that particular point.42 Instead, the Court's precedents, the
36. William H. Rehnquist, The Old Order Changeth: The Department of Justice Under
John Mitchell, 12 ARIZ. L. REv. 251, 255 (1970) (internal quotations omitted) (remarks
before the Honors Convocation of the University of Arizona College of Law).
37. Id. Although Rehnquist's convocation remarks speak in terms of the Attorney
General's views, it is clear that he shared them. See, e.g., Nominations of William H.
Rehnquist and Lewis F. Powell, Jr.: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 92nd
Cong. 42 (1971) [hereinafter Rehnquist Nomination Hearings] (statement of William H.
Rehnquist) (stating in the context of criminal prosecutions "the idea that the Justice
Department is basically an advocate for the public is one which I have found myself unable
to subscribe to").
38. Rehnquist Nomination Hearings, supra note 37, at 185.
39. The Pocket Veto Power: Hearing Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 92nd Cong. 22, 23 (1971) [hereinafter Pocket Veto Power Hearing] (statement of
William H. Rehnquist, Assistant Attorney General, Department of Justice).
40. That is not to say that Rehnquist believed the different branches could interpret
constitutional text any way they liked. See, e.g., The Independence of Federal Judges:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the S. Comm., 91st Cong. 331
(1970) (statement of William H. Rehnquist, Assistant Attorney General, Department of
Justice) ("I think that any time you have any language that requires construction, no one
would say that the body charged with construing it is entirely free to roam at will. And I
don't suppose Congress is any more free [sic] than a court is in construing. But to me the
words themselves don't admit any ready definition.").
41. Pocket Veto Power Hearing, supra note 39, at 25.
42. This view anticipated the Rehnquist Court's later assertion of judicial supremacy in
the interpretation of the Constitution. Compare id. at 24 ("I would draw back at the notion
that the Congress is free to define in some sort of binding way any number of terms in the
Constitution, anymore than the Executive is free to define them."), with City of Boerne v.
Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 535-36 (1997) (Kennedy, J.) (emphasizing Court's supremacy in
interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment).
[Vol. 58:17351742
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lawyer's law, definitively interpreted the constitutional text and thereby
assumed greater importance than it.
2. Rehnquist's watch at OLC
During his tenure at OLC, Rehnquist advised the Nixon administration on
the separation of powers in a variety of contexts. Here, we focus on a small
segment of that advice to consider whether Rehnquist's separation of powers
jurisprudence is the evolving beast of the Sphinx's riddle or whether Rehnquist
has adhered to some basic principles that explain his votes and opinions over
time.43 In particular, we consider his OLC opinions on impoundment, the
President's power as Commander in Chief, and executive privilege.44
a. Impoundment
Impoundment occurs when the President exercises discretion to decline to
spend money appropriated by Congress for a particular purpose. Relying in part
on congressional floor statements, Nixon claimed an inherent "constitutional
right to refuse to spend funds which Congress has appropriated. ' 4 5 Nixon's
argument would have been roughly as follows: appropriation is an
authorization to spend money, but the President, in whom the Constitution
vests the executive power, has discretion whether or not actually to spend all of
the authorized funds. Thus, the issue raised by impoundment is fundamentally a
separation of powers issue: whether the President has constitutional authority to
refuse to spend where the congressional appropriation act or legislation requires
the expenditure. 46 Rehnquist's advice on impoundment is particularly
renowned, because he rebuffed Nixon's assertion by concluding the President
lacked any inherent executive authority to impound, at least in the domestic
43. We acknowledge that Rehnquist's opinions at OLC were informed by prior
executive precedents and were likely collaboratively prepared as an advocate and counselor
for the President's prerogatives and thus may not represent his views.
44. To obtain the necessary primary materials, Professor Samahon filed three Freedom
of Information Act (FOIA) requests with divisions of the Justice Department. At the time of
this Article's publication, one FOIA request remained outstanding and another had been
denied in part. Thus, our conclusions here are necessarily tentative and subject to revision,
pending the Justice Department's response to the requests. The disclosed documents
discussed in this Part will be made available through the Stanford Law Review website,
http://lawreview.stanford.edu.
45. Memorandum from William H. Rehnquist, Assistant Attorney General, Office of
Legal Counsel, to the Honorable Edward L. Morgan, Deputy Counsel to the President, Re:
Presidential Authority To Impound Funds Appropriated for Assistance to Federally Impacted
Schools (Dec. 1, 1969) [hereinafter Impoundment Memo], reprinted in Executive
Impoundment of Appropriated Funds: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Separation of
Powers of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong. 279-91 (1971).
46. Id.
1743
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field.47
In a legal opinion that silently undertakes a Youngstown analysis,
Rehnquist explained that, in the area of domestic affairs, the President may not
impound appropriations but has a duty to make mandatory expenditures. 48 He
rejected the claim that Article II's Vesting Clause authorized impoundment: "It
may be argued that the spending of money is inherently an executive function,
but the execution of any law is, by definition, an executive function, and it
seems an anomalous proposition that because the Executive branch is bound to
execute the laws, it is free to decline to execute them.' 49 This analysis reflects
that Rehnquist appreciated that some of the President's power derives from
Congress. The President does not have an independent executive power to
create national policy "independent from his duty to execute" laws that
Congress passes.50 Thus, where Congress has spoken clearly by way of its
appropriation and the President acts incompatibly with that expressed will in a
field where his power is only derivative from Congress,5 1 the President's power
is at its nadir, a classical Jackson category-three-type conflict.
To be sure, Rehnquist thought a "better argument" might be made for
impoundment where Congress had not spoken clearly in the language of the
appropriation or left some discretion for the executive. After all, although the
Constitution explicitly requires appropriation as a necessary condition to
spending, it does not make appropriation a sufficient condition for spending.
52
But this argument merely relies on Congress delegating some discretion to the
President. 5 Arguably, it would create a Jackson category two, within the zone
of twilight, where the President acts without a congressional denial of power.
But Rehnquist did not categorically deny that the President had a power to
impound. His advice concerning impoundment differed in the fields of national
security and foreign affairs. Although he does not cite Youngstown, here too he
47. This advice contradicts the unflattering claim that Rehnquist simply justified
"whatever expansion of executive authority President Nixon desired." DONALD E. BOLES,
MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST, JUDICIAL ACTIVIST: THE EARLY YEARS 26 (1987).
48. Executive Impoundment of Appropriated Funds: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Separation of Powers of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 92nd Cong. 235, 238 (1971)
[hereinafter Impoundment Hearings] (statement of William H. Rehnquist, Assistant Attorney
General, Department of Justice).
49. Impoundment Memo, supra note 45. On the other hand, few would question the
proposition that the executive has discretion to decline to prosecute, even where Congress
has enacted a criminal law and the President is bound to faithfully execute the laws of the
United States. See United States v. Navarro-Vargas, 408 F.3d 1184, 1205-06 (9th Cir. 2005)
(en banc); United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir. 1965).
50. Impoundment Memo, supra note 45.
51. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
52. Impoundment Hearings, supra note 48, at 243.
53. Rehnquist opined that the President might also have authority to impound where
congressional appropriations created contradictory mandates. Where the President was
confronted with "real and imminent conflicting statutory demands," the Take Care Clause
might justify his refusal to spend. Impoundment Memo, supra note 45.
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appears to apply sub silentio Jackson's mode of analysis. For Rehnquist, unlike
domestic policy, national security and foreign affairs are areas where the
President has substantive power enumerated, for example, in the clauses
making him Commander in Chief and granting him the power to send and
receive ambassadors. 54 That situation differs from the domestic setting because
the President would be asserting his own substantive powers enumerated in the
Constitution-not merely executing laws passed pursuant to Congress's
enumerated powers.
55
If a conflict were to arise between the President and Congress on an
impoundment where Congress mandated national security expenditures, then a
Youngstown category-three analysis would be in order: Congress has expressed
its will by a mandatory appropriations statute, but the President refuses to make
the expenditures. In such an instance, the conflict's resolution will depend on
the contours and reach of the President's own substantive powers over national
security as compared to Congress's competing claim to direct the nation's
foreign affairs.
56
This approach to impoundment has the virtue of forcing Congress, the
politically appropriate branch, to take responsibility for its own duties to
control spending rather than allow the buck to pass to the President to exercise
fiscal restraint. On this account, Congress could authorize impoundment, but it
would need to make the policy judgment in its legislation that it granted
discretion to the President on a specific appropriation. Otherwise, the President,
having failed to veto the appropriation, may not then undermine national policy
by virtue of a clause vesting in him the power to execute the laws of the land.
b. The President's power as Commander in Chief
Nixon's conduct of the Vietnam War raised several issues requiring
Rehnquist and OLC to defend the President's authority to act. When Vietcong
forces took up sanctuary in Cambodia, Nixon ordered the secret aerial bombing
of these sanctuaries as a part of the war. Rehnquist defended the President's
actions as a lawful exercise of Nixon's Commander-in-Chief power. Below we
discuss Rehnquist's reasoning as given in his Cambodian sanctuaries
memorandum and elsewhere. 57
Although acknowledging that the boundaries between the President and
Congress with respect to the war power are indistinct, Rehnquist noted the
54. See infra note 61 and accompanying text.
55. Impoundment Memo, supra note 45.
56. Impoundment Hearings, supra note 48, at 235.
57. Memorandum from William H. Rehnquist, Assistant Attorney General, Office of
Legal Counsel, to the Honorable Charles W. Colson, Special Counsel to the President, Re:
The President and the War Power: South Vietnam and the Cambodian Sanctuaries (May 22,
1970) [hereinafter Cambodian Sanctuaries Memo].
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textual significance that Congress had power to "declare," not "make" war.
58
At the Constitutional Convention, Rufus King had proposed the substitution of
the word "declare war" for "make war," to clarify that Congress did not have
the ability to actually "conduct" a war.59 Rather, that power was vested with
the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, the President.
The Constitution, however, leaves the scope of the Commander-in-Chief
power undefined, and Rehnquist looked to precedent and historical practice to
give that term content. He concluded from the few on point cases that the
Commander-in-Chief Clause granted a substantive power to the President-that
is, the Clause was "not merely a commission which entitles him to precedence
in a reviewing stand," but implied actual duties and powers to fulfill those
duties. 61 In support, Rehnquist invoked Jackson's Youngstown concurrence-
not for the proposition that the Commander-in-Chief power has limitations, but
to distinguish Youngstown and place the Cambodian sanctuaries action on a
different footing because it was in a foreign theater of war: "I should indulge
the widest latitude of interpretation to sustain his exclusive function to
command the instruments of national force, at least when turned against the
outside world for the security of our society."62 Rehnquist then looked to the
history of prior military engagements and their terms, from the conflicts with
Barbary pirates off the shores of Tripoli to the Korean War, to determine
inductively the scope of the President's authority by reference to prior action.
63
This history of how each of the three branches has interpreted the Constitution
provided further direction as to what the President may undertake on his own
initiative and what actions require congressional assent.
64
From these historical precedents, Rehnquist inductively concluded that the
principal powers of the Commander in Chief include the ability to commit
forces to conflict where they have not previously been engaged; deploy forces
globally; and conduct hostilities "once lawfully begun." 65 Rehnquist defended
58. Id. at 1.
59. Id. at 1-2. For a discussion questioning the significance of this change in verbs, see
generally Charles A. Lofgren, War-Making Under the Constitution: The Original
Understanding, 81 YALE L.J. 672 (1972).
60. Cambodian Sanctuaries Memo, supra note 57, at 7.
61. Id. at 4-5; see also William H. Rehnquist, The Constitutional Issues-
Administration Position, 45 N.Y.U. L. REV. 628, 631 (1970) (remarks before the Association
of the Bar on the Cambodian sanctuaries situation).
62. Cambodian Sanctuaries Memo, supra note 57, at 6-7 (quoting Youngstown Sheet
& Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 645 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)) (emphasis
added).
63. Id. at 8-13.
64. Rehnquist, supra note 61, at 629.
65. Id. at 631-32, 635; see also Congress, the President, and the War Powers:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments of
the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 91st Cong. 235 (1970) [hereinafter War Powers Hearings]
(statement of William H. Rehnquist, Assistant Attorney General, Department of Justice)
(agreeing that the power over tactical decisions is a "flow of power under the duties of the
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the Commander in Chief's Cambodian incursions as falling historically within
the executive's ken as concerning the tactical conduct of hostilities lawfully
begun in the Vietnam War.66 These inductively derived fields of historical
authority, however, do not cap executive power at a ceiling. Rehnquist's case-
by-case common law approach to executive power would allow for further
development. Congress could enhance the Commander in Chief's substantive
power by delegating additional authority to the President. Moreover, it could
do so without regard to the traditional constraints of the nondelegation doctrine
operative in domestic affairs; the nondelegation doctrine does not apply to the
sui generis case of "external affairs," 67 perhaps because the President and
Congress share responsibility and discretion in this area.
Conversely, Rehnquist acknowledged that the text of the Constitution
contemplates that Congress may in some circumstances, such as pursuant to its
power to "make rules concerning captures on land and water," limit "the
President's power as Commander-in-Chief to a narrower scope than it would
have had in the absence of legislation." 68 But Rehnquist testified that there
were limits to Congress's ability to regulate the President's war powers.
Although the Constitution by its terms arguably requires a congressional
declaration of war, Rehnquist relied on the lawyer's law of the Constitution,
precedent and actual practice, which have never interpreted the constitutional
text so literally. Instead, he rejected the claim that Congress could
constitutionally bind the President with legislation prohibiting the initiation of
war without a formal congressional declaration. He cited the President's
"traditional powers as commander in chief," which might include committing
U.S. armed forces to hostilities. 69 Congress's proposal could have been
understood as simply restoring the formal procedure for handling hostilities
originally mandated by the Constitution's text. Rehnquist, however, was
disinclined to view historical practice as merely accumulated plaque on the
teeth of constitutional text. His approach to the separation of powers was a
common law approach, not that of a civil judge unbound by stare decisis.
c. Executive privilege
Executive privilege was raised several times during Rehnquist's tenure,
including when the Senate sought to obtain from the executive the entirety of
the Pentagon Papers, following their partial publication, and other documents
relating to national security and foreign relations. As with Rehnquist's advice
concerning the scope of the Commander-in-Chief power, his advice concerning
Commander in Chief').
66. Rehnquist, supra note 61, at 638.
67. Cambodian Sanctuaries Memo, supra note 57, at 18, 20; Rehnquist, supra note 61,
at 636-37.
68. Cambodian Sanctuaries Memo, supra note 57, at 20.
69. War Powers Hearings, supra note 65, at 232 (emphasis added).
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executive privilege displays his common law approach to constitutional
adjudication where the constitutional text is underdetermined or silent. In the
setting of executive privilege, the Constitution's broad lines mention neither
congressional authority to investigate or demand documents nor the executive's
concomitant ability to resist.70 Instead, the President's authority to withhold
documents against compulsory process by the legislative or judicial branches is
merely implied by the separation of powers.
71
To trace this implied privilege's contours, Rehnquist did not begin with
abstract separation of powers first principles. He did not deduce when the
President could withhold documents from Congress or the Courts by reference
to a grand theory of what functions are encompassed in the executive and
whether the executive is unitary. Instead, he looked to the history of interbranch
tugs-of-war concerning privilege and the past practices acceded to by other
branches. 72 From these examples, he inductively arrived at rough groupings of
constitutionally supported privilege. Thus, Rehnquist's memoranda on
privilege are chiefly historical documentations of prior instances of asserted
privilege. 73 Based on his survey of prior history, Rehnquist suggested the
existence of privilege in the fields of foreign relations, military affairs, pending
investigations, and intra-governmental discussions.
74
Interestingly, Rehnquist's advice on executive privilege suggests that had
he participated in the Nixon Tapes Case,75 he might have provided the ninth
vote against Nixon. 76 Historical precedent did not support the claim that a
70. U.S. Government Information Policies and Practices-The Pentagon Papers (Part
2): Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Government Operations, 92nd Cong.
359 (1971) [hereinafter Pentagon Papers Hearings] (statement of William H. Rehnquist,
Assistant Attorney General, Department of Justice).
71. Id.
72. Executive Privilege: The Withholding of Information by the Executive: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 92nd Cong.
420 (1971) [hereinafter Executive Privilege Hearing] (statement of William H. Rehnquist,
Assistant Attorney General, Department of Justice).
73. See, e.g., Memorandum from William H. Rehnquist, Assistant Attorney General,
Office of Legal Counsel, to the Honorable John D. Ehrlichman, Assistant to the President for
Domestic Affairs, Re: Power of Congressional Committee To Compel Appearance or
Testimony of "White House Staff" (Feb. 5, 1971) [hereinafter White House Staff Memo];
Memorandum from John R. Stevenson, Legal Adviser, Department of State, and William H.
Rehnquist, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Re: The President's
Executive Privilege To Withhold Foreign Policy and National Security Information (Dec. 8,
1969).
74. Executive Privilege Hearing, supra note 72, at 422.
75. United States v. Nixon (Nixon Tapes Case), 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
76. Of course, Rehnquist had recused himself. One commentator has suggested that
Rehnquist recused himself because of his earlier work at OLC, Keith E. Whittington,
William H. Rehnquist: Nixon's Strict Constructionist, Reagan 's Chief Justice, in REHNQUIST
JUSTICE: UNDERSTANDING THE COURT DYNAMIC 19 (Earl M. Maltz ed., 2003), which
included advising on executive privilege. Rehnquist clearly had advised and testified
publicly on executive privilege issues. That advice, however, was not the cause for recusal.
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President could withhold documents merely because they would "make [him]
look bad,",77 and "the claim of privilege for documents is not necessarily
coextensive" with the President's absolute personal immunity from subpoena.
78
In fact, a President could be vulnerable to a subpoena duces tecum, as
"fumishing... a document to a congressional committee involves little, if any,
inconvenience to the Executive Branch or to the President and his advisers."
79
To be sure, Rehnquist's advice was given in the context of interbranch disputes
between Congress and the President. How he would have voted in an intra-
branch dispute, such as the Nixon Tapes Case, is necessarily speculative. But
without some kind of theory of a unitary executive or some historical
precedent, it seems likely he would have cast his vote against Nixon.
II. REHNQUIST ON THE COURT
In this Part, we consider Rehnquist's separation of powers cases on the
Court. We examine the theme that Rehnquist viewed the separation of powers
as a means of reinforcing the legislature's duty to make policy. In addition, we
consider the Rehnquist theme of common law incrementalism, present in his
OLC opinions, which reemerges in his treatment of Youngstown and disputes
between the executive and legislature.
A. Associate Justice Rehnquist
Nixon nominated Rehnquist and Lewis Powell to the Court following a
series of administration debacles with judicial nominations. With Rehnquist's
appointment, it appeared that Nixon had found his "strict constructionist." To
assess the early Justice Rehnquist, we consider his nondelegation and federal
common law cases, Dames & Moore v. Regan, and three cases involving
appointment, removal, and bicameralism and presentment.
After all, Rehnquist participated in Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425
(1977), where the Presidential Materials and Recordings Act was challenged on executive
privilege and separation of powers grounds. Instead, Rehnquist very likely recused himself
in the Nixon Tapes Case, 418 U.S. 683, Kissinger v. Halperin, 452 U.S. 713 (1981), and
Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985), because John Mitchell, the former Attorney
General, was a party in each case "individually, and not simply as an attorney for a client."
Memorandum from William H. Rehnquist to the Conference, Re: No. 79-880 Kissinger v.
Halperin (May 27, 1981), in THE HARRY A. BLACKMUN PAPERS, Supreme Court File, 1918-
1999, Box 323, Folder 1, No. 79-880 (Library of Congress).
77. Pentagon Papers Hearings, supra note 70, at 784.
78. White House Staff Memo, supra note 73.
79. Id.
1749
HeinOnline -- 58 Stan. L. Rev. 1749 2005-2006
STANFORD LA W REVIEW
1. The nondelegation doctrine and implied causes of action
Rehnquist attempted to breathe life into the moribund nondelegation
doctrine in Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum
Institute80 and American Textile Manufacturers Institute, Inc. v. Donovan.8 1 In
these cases, Rehnquist concurred and dissented, respectively, because the
majorities failed to conclude that section 6(b) of the Occupational Safety and
Health Act (OSHA) violated the nondelegation doctrine. 82 Delegations of
legislative power from Congress to the executive are permitted to allow the
regulation of technical fields, where members of Congress are not experts,
provided Congress establishes "the general policy and standards that animate
the law, leaving the agency to refine those standards, 'fill in the blanks,' or
apply the standards to particular cases." 83 Congress must articulate an
"intelligible principle" to guide the executive's discretion in exercising
congressionally delegated power.84 For Rehnquist, Congress, not the executive
branch, is the "governmental body best suited and most obligated to make"
difficult policy choices.85 It alone must make the tough policy decisions rather
than pass the buck to the President. Thus, Rehnquist attempted to use the
nondelegation doctrine to hold Congress's "feet to the fire" by forcing
Congress to be conscientious. As a measure of Rehnquist's commitment to the
legislature making the policy decisions, we note that the nondelegation doctrine
previously had been invoked successfully only twice to strike down a statute as
an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the executive.86 In fact,
unless one considers Clinton v. City of New York a nondelegation case,87 the
nondelegation doctrine has not been successfully invoked to strike down a
statute since 1935. This pattern of voting differs from Rehnquist's later votes
on nondelegation.
In a similar vein, Rehnquist demonstrated great reluctance to imply causes
of action as a function of the Court's federal common law power, believing that
this power too divested the legislature of its rightful place as policymaker. In
80. 448 U.S. 607 (1980).
81. 452 U.S. 490 (1981).
82. American Textile, 452 U.S. at 543; Industrial. Union, 448 U.S. at 671.
83. Industrial Union, 448 U.S. at 675.
84. Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 429-30 (1935).
85. Industrial Union, 448 U.S. at 672.
86. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama
Refining, 293 U.S. 388.
87. 524 U.S. 417 (1998). Although Clinton protested it was merely about presentment
and bicameralism, id. at 447-48, we join other commentators in concluding that, in fact, the
case may reinvigorate the nondelegation doctrine. See Calabresi, supra note 5, at 85;
Michael B. Rappaport, The Selective Nondelegation Doctrine and the Line Item Veto: A New
Approach to the Nondelegation Doctrine and Its Implications for Clinton v. City of New
York, 76 TuL. L. REv. 265 (2001).
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Cannon v. University of Chicago,88 Carlson v. Green,89 and City of Milwaukee
v. Illinois,90 Rehnquist disfavored the implication of private causes of action
under statute or the Constitution. Instead, he favored congressional
authorization of new causes of action: Congress knows how to authorize
private causes of action by statute if it so desires. The Court, under guise of
adjudication, should not intrude on this core lawmaking function. Thus, for
Rehnquist, the decision to imply a cause of action violates the separation of
powers by usurping legislative power.
Both the nondelegation doctrine and the refusal to imply remedies
highlight a key theme to Rehnquist's separation of powers jurisprudence:
"insist that the constitutionally appropriate political body make those choices
and that the Court has a role in ensuring that no institution either shirks its
responsibilities or encroaches on the proper sphere of another."9 1 Congress
must not shirk; the judiciary may not usurp.92
2. Foreign affairs and national security
In Dames & Moore v. Regan,93 Rehnquist's majority opinion enshrined
Jackson's Youngstown framework in the majority's analysis of the executive
response to the Iranian hostage crisis.94 Among the conditions for the release of
U.S. hostages, the United States agreed to nullify attachments against Iranian
assets in the United States and suspend any claims against Iran, submitting
them instead to a U.S.-Iran Claims Tribunal. Dames and Moore challenged
these executive acts nullifying attachments and suspending claims as not
congressionally authorized by the International Emergency Economic Powers
Act (IEEPA) or otherwise. Although the Court determined that statute fairly
88. 441 U.S. 677, 718 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) ("[T]his Court in the future
should be extremely reluctant to imply a cause of action absent such specificity on the part of
the Legislative Branch.").
89. 446 U.S. 14, 34 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("In my view, it is 'an exercise
of power that the Constitution does not give us' for this Court to infer a private civil
damages remedy from the Eighth Amendment or any other constitutional provision.").
90. 451 U.S. 304, 317 (1981) (Rehnquist, J.) (concluding that Congress had preempted
federal common law).
91. Whittington, supra note 76, at 21.
92. A legal positivism of sorts may animate Rehnquist's approach. See, e.g., William
H. Rehnquist, Observation, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEx. L. REv. 693, 704
(1976) (revised text of ninth annual Will E. Orgain Lecture, University of Texas School of
Law) ("It is the fact of [laws'] enactment that gives them whatever moral claim they have
upon us as a society ... and not any independent virtue they may have in any particular
citizen's own scale of values.").
93. 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
94. We are not the first coauthors to observe the irony that Rehnquist was both
Jackson's law clerk during Youngstown and the author of Dames & Moore. See Harold
Hongju Koh & John Choon Yoo, Dollar Diplomacy/Dollar Defense: The Fabric of
Economics and National Security Law, 26 INT'L LAW. 715, 745 n.133 (1992).
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authorized the nullifying of the attachments, it concluded IEEPA did not
authorize the claims suspension. Thus, a Youngstown dispute arose over
whether the President had authority to act unilaterally.
Rehnquist's opinion tells the reader in no less than four different ways that
the Court is undertaking a case-by-case approach to the issue of executive
power by declining to articulate any abstract, bright-line rules.95 It is the
modest approach of common law incrementalism in an area where
constitutional text ill defines the borders of congressional and executive power.
Although Rehnquist incants Jackson's three Youngstown categories96 and calls
them "analytically useful," he characterizes them as merely points along a
"spectrum running from explicit congressional authorization to explicit
congressional prohibition."97 Thereafter, Rehnquist ceases any further
reference to Jackson's categories as if they were defined by bright lines, but
speaks only in terms of where along the spectrum of "explicit congressional
authorization to explicit congressional prohibition" this case falls.98 In fact,
Rehnquist never says under which of the Jackson categories the President's
suspension of the claims actually falls.
Rather than categorize this conflict between the executive and Congress,
Rehnquist places the claims suspension along the congressional "authorization-
prohibition" spectrum. He interprets IEEPA's failure to authorize claims
suspension-in light of prior congressional acquiescence to executive
establishment of claims tribunals, IEEPA's other provisions, the Hostage Act,
and congressional silence-as implicit congressional authorization for the
executive's suspension of claims. 99 Arguably, this reading collapses Jackson's
tripartite classification into a two-tiered inquiry-shifting the Iranian hostage
crisis into Jackson category one (the category most favorable to the executive)
rather than Jackson category two. 100
Justice Blackmun took exception with this approach. He asked Rehnquist
to reconsider the draft opinion's language stating that
the enactment of legislation closely related to the question of the President's
authority in a particular case which evinces legislative intent to accord the
President broad discretion may be considered to 'invite' measures on
independent presidential responsibility. At least this is so where there is no
contrary indication of legislative intent and when, as here, there is a history of
congressional acquiescence in conduct of the sort engaged in by the
95. See, e.g., Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 660 ("We are confined to a resolution of
the dispute presented to us."); id. at 661 ("We attempt to lay down no general 'guidelines'
covering other situations not involved here .. "); id. ("[T]he decisions of the Court in this
area.., afford little precedential value for subsequent cases."); id. at 662 ("deciding only
one more episode .....
96. Id. at 668-69.
97. Id. at 669.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 678.
100. See Koh & Yoo, supra note 94, at 745.
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President. 101
Blackmun found Rehnquist's position difficult to reconcile with Rehnquist's
views of the nondelegation doctrine, where Congress had to articulate an
"intelligible principle" in order to delegate legislative power to the
executive. 102 Under Rehnquist's approach, Congress had merely to enact
legislation in the field to implicitly authorize or invite presidential action.
Rehnquist, however, was unmoved. He justified his position by invoking
Curtiss-Wright and the uniqueness of foreign affairs, an area where the
nondelegation doctrine operates somewhat differently than in the purely
domestic contextl 03-perhaps because the President as Commander in Chief
shares a substantive grant of power to act along with Congress.
3. The appointments, bicameralism, and presentment cases
We discuss very briefly three other separation of powers cases in which
Rehnquist participated as an Associate Justice. First, we consider Buckley v.
Valeo to illustrate Rehnquist's commitment to constitutional text when it
speaks specifically and clearly. In Buckley, Rehnquist authored the
Appointments Clause analysis that struck down Congress's effort to vest some
of the power to appoint to the Federal Election Commission in the Speaker of
the House and the President pro tempore of the Senate. 104 The excepting
provision of the Appointments Clause allows Congress to vest the
appointments of "inferior officers" "in the President alone, in the Courts of
Law, or in the Heads of Departments."' 1 5 Under the Appointments Clause,
neither the Speaker of the House nor the President pro tempore of the Senate
(or any other member of Congress, for that matter) is enumerated as a possible
designated recipient of the appointing power. Thus, the plain commands of the
Constitution direct a fairly easy resolution of the case.
Second, in INS v. Chadha,10 6 the Court struck down a legislative veto
provision as violating the bicameralism and presentment provisions of the
Constitution. Rehnquist dissented. His dissent, however, did not register
101. Letter from Harry A. Blackmun to William H. Rehnquist, Re: No. 80-2078
Dames and Moore v. Regan (June 29, 1981), in THE HARRY A. BLACKMUN PAPERS, Supreme
Court File, 1918-1999, Box 336, Folder 8, No. 80-2078 (Library of Congress) (referencing
Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 678-79 (internal quotations omitted)).
102. Id.
103. Letter from William H. Rehnquist to Harry A. Blackmun, Re: No. 80-2078
Dames & Moore v. Regan (June 29, 1981), in THE HARRY A. BLACKMUN PAPERS, Supreme
Court File, 1918-1999, Box 336, Folder 8, No. 80-2078 (Library of Congress).
104. 424 U.S. 1 (1976). The Blackmun Papers confirm that Rehnquist was the author
of Part IV.B of the per curiam opinion. First Draft, Buckley v. Valeo, Memorandum from Mr.
Justice Rehnquist (Jan. 17, 1976), in THE HARRY A. BLACKMUN PAPERS, Supreme Court File,
1918-1999, Box 231, Folder 2, No. 75-436 (Library of Congress).
105. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
106. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
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disagreement with bicameralism and presentment, but rather with the
severability of the legislative veto provision from the rest of the statutory
scheme. Thus, Rehnquist did not appear to disagree with the majority's
separation of powers analysis. 107
That is not to say that Rehnquist's dissent about severability was merely
about statutory construction and did not harbor separation of powers concerns
of another sort. Justice Blackmun's conference notes indicate that Rehnquist
was concerned that striking down only the legislative veto without the rest of
the legislative package would upset the legislature's appointed role as
policymaker. 10 8 Rehnquist did not feel the executive should benefit by the
Court striking down the legislative veto but not the delegations of power to the
executive. To Rehnquist, the executive had "unclean hands" in the case by
signing the bill.109 He felt strongly that Congress would not have adopted the
legislation delegating power to the executive had it known the legislative veto
would not withstand scrutiny. 110 To avoid the President receiving large
amounts of delegated power without the check of a legislative veto, Rehnquist
would interpret the statute to reinforce Congress's role as deliberative
policymaker-by striking down the whole statute as unconstitutional. Thus, his
Chadha dissent is characteristic of Rehnquist for its insistence that Congress
make policy, that legislation be considered as a whole, and that the executive
take the "bitter with the sweet."111
Finally, in Bowsher v. Synar,112 Rehnquist voted with the majority to strike
down the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act's provision vesting the Comptroller
General, a legislative officer, with executive power and making him removable
only at Congress's initiative. As the Comptroller exercised executive power but
was removable by Congress, "Congress in effect [had] retained control over the
execution of the Act and has intruded into the executive function."1 1 3 The
Justices' correspondence indicates Chief Justice Burger's early circulated draft
of the majority opinion, which concerned congressional inability to condition
the removal of purely executive officers, also cast doubt on Humphrey's
Executor and the independent agencies. 114 It has been suggested that Rehnquist
was complicit in Burger's desire to overrule Humphrey's Executor as he did not
107. Id. at 1013 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
108. INS v. Chadha Conference Notes (Feb. 24, 1982), in THE HARRY A. BLACKMUN




111. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 154 (1974) (Rehnquist, J.).
112. 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
113. Id. at 734.
114. See, e.g., Letter from Justice Brennan to Chief Justice Burger, Re: Nos. 85-1377,
85-1378, 85-1379 (n.d.), in THE HARRY A. BLACKMUN PAPERS, Supreme Court File, 1918-
1999, Box 456, Folder 6 (Library of Congress).
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object to Burger's circulated opinion. 115 Although Rehnquist would likely
question Congress's arrangement under Myers v. United States,116 it would be
somewhat atypical of Rehnquist to articulate an abstract separation of powers
principle that overruled an earlier case needlessly and applied far beyond the
facts of the case. It may be a hasty inference that Rehnquist agreed with Burger
where other Justices had already raised the draft's possible consequences for
Humphrey's Executor.
B. Chief Justice Rehnquist
As Chief Justice, Rehnquist authored several separation of powers
opinions, including Raines v. Byrd,"' Ryder v. United States,' i8 Dalton v.
Specter, 1 9 Weiss v. United States, 120 and Walter Nixon v. United States.
12 1
These cases largely follow Rehnquist's pattern established as Associate Justice
of reinforcing the responsibility of the political branches, employing
incrementalism, and following the commands of clear constitutional text. His
votes on other cases, however, where he was not the opinion's author, reflect a
Chief Justice who was less assertive in pressing the nondelegation doctrine than
he was as an Associate Justice.
122
Morrison v. Olson,123 however, where Rehnquist did have the pen, stands
most prominently among these cases as the biggest mystery in Rehnquist's
separation of powers jurisprudence. We focus on it to consider whether it
indeed is an outlier or whether it can be reconciled with Rehnquist's approach
to the separation of powers.
Morrison pits two former Republican heads of OLC-Rehnquist and
Scalia-against one another in a case that recharacterized Humphrey's
Executor and Myers to permit Congress substantially more say in conditioning124
the removal of executive officers. 12 Chief Justice Rehnquist assigned the case
to himself and authored the majority opinion, which upheld the independent
counsel provisions of the Ethics in Government Act against facial separation of
115. See Bernard Schwartz, Curiouser and Curiouser: The Supreme Court's
Separation of Powers Wonderland, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 587, 640 (1990).
116. 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
117. 521 U.S. 811 (1997).
118. 515 U.S. 177 (1995).
119. 511 U.S. 462 (1994).
120. 510 U.S. 163 (1994).
121. 506 U.S. 224 (1993).
122. See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'n, 531 U.S. 457 (2001) (declining to
find statute in violation of nondelegation doctrine); Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160
(1991) (same); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (concluding no excessive
delegation).
123. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
124. Daniel A. Farber, The Independent Counsel Case: A Tale of Two Conservatives,
in THE REHNQUIST LEGACY 222, 233 (Craig Bradley ed., 2006).
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power challenges. Scalia dissented alone.
The Act provided for a curious interbranch appointment of an independent
counsel by invoking the opt-out "excepting" provision of the Appointments
Clause. 125 Congress vested in a special division of the D.C. Circuit the ability
to appoint an independent prosecutor who the Attorney General could not
remove, except for "good cause." 126 Thus, judicial officers would appoint an
executive officer and designate the scope of that officer's jurisdiction to
investigate. Neither the President nor his delegate, the Attorney General, could
remove the executive officer, except for "good cause," 127 which apparently did
not include failure to follow orders of the Attorney General or the President.
Congress intended this novel arrangement to solve the inherent conflict of
interest presented by the executive branch investigating high-ranking executive
officers, such as the President or Attorney General, as had existed during
Watergate.
One of the key issues in Morrison was whether the independent counsel
was an "inferior officer" such that Congress could opt-out of the traditional
presidential nomination, senatorial advice, and consent processes. If the
independent counsel was not an "inferior officer," but a "principal officer,"
Congress could not vest the appointment in the judiciary. Moreover, whether
appointed by the judiciary or not, a second issue was whether the independent
counsel, who exercised the core executive function of prosecution, could be
insulated from presidential removal at will, such that she could be removed
only for "good cause." Finally, the Court considered whether the Act, taken as
a whole, violated the separation of powers.
It is clear from Blackmun's conference notes that Rehnquist had policy
doubts about the Act's wisdom, but it is equally clear that Rehnquist expressed
that he believed the Act to be constitutional. 128 After all, the "excepting"
provision of the Appointments Clause grants Congress discretion in the vesting
of inferior officer appointments; it uses the words "as they think proper." 129
Nothing in the Constitutional Convention suggested that interbranch
appointments were impermissible or, for that matter, contemplated. In the
absence of a positive prohibition, Rehnquist was not inclined to strike down the
Act's provision for an "interbranch" appointment. Similarly, Rehnquist
approached the construction of the term "inferior officer" as a common law
125. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 661.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Morrison v. Olson Conference Notes (Apr. 29, 1988), in THE HARRY A.
BLACKMUN PAPERS, Supreme Court File, 1918-1999, Box 507, Folder 8, No. 87-1279
(Library of Congress) ("I have misgivings [concerning the] Act but [it is not]
unconstitutional."). This doubt may explain why Rehnquist avoided reliance on the Act's
purported benefits as support for his separation of powers analysis and confirms scholarly
conjecture to that effect. Farber, supra note 124, at 237.
129. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
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judge reluctant to articulate a priori bright-line rules, but favorably disposed
toward cautious, even if somewhat unpredictable, case-by-case
determinations. 130 This same "common law" approach to constitutional
adjudication is apparent in the "impermissible" burden standard Rehnquist
articulated in determining whether Congress may condition the removal of
executive officers.a31
Morrison, however, is a curious opinion for Rehnquist in an important
regard. In a departure from incrementalism, the Court decided the case more
broadly than necessary by recharacterizing Myers and Humphrey's Executor in
the process. Myers stood for the proposition that the executive enjoyed general
removal powers over executive branch officers.1 32 Humphrey's Executor stood
as an exception to the Myers proposition: Congress could restrict the
President's removal power when the officer exercised quasi-judicial or quasi-
legislative powers, which is to say not purely executive powers. 133 Morrison
"flipped the relationship": Myers was reconceived as merely an exception from
the "general principle that Congress may reasonably restrict the President's
removal power."' 3 , The Court could have concluded incrementally that the
independent counsel was another exception, like Humphrey's Executor, to the
general proposition that the President can remove executive officers at will.
135
Instead, the Court espoused Humphrey's Executor as the standard. Post-
Morrison, Congress may generally restrict presidential removal (including
removal of officers whose duties are purely executive) provided that Congress
expressly supplies the restriction. Why was the decision not more incremental?
In assessing Morrison's position in Rehnquist's separation of powers
jurisprudence, it is helpful to remember that it does not stand in isolation. It has
a postlude that, in light of the Justices' positions espoused in the case, casts
doubt on its continued vitality. During Morrison, a focal point of contention
was whether or not the independent counsel was an "inferior" or principal
officer. Scalia's dissent characterized the independent counsel as a principal
officer because she was not "subordinate" to anyone, inferring such a
requirement from the meaning of "inferior." This position espoused the
argument advanced by the Solicitor General's amicus brief, filed by special
leave of court on behalf of the defendants: "An officer who exercises
prosecutorial power, and who is not subordinate to anyone in the exercise of
that power, is not an 'inferior' officer." 136 Although not clear from the opinion
itself, it is clear from Blackmun's conference notes that both Rehnquist and
130. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 671-73.
131. Id. at 676.
132. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
133. Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
134. Farber, supra note 128, at 233.
135. Id.
136. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellees at 24,
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (No. 87-1279).
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O'Connor rejected the subordination principle as a bright-line rule. 137 Instead,
Morrison employed a balancing test of four factors to conclude that the
independent counsel was an "inferior officer."' 138
Enter Edmond v. United States.139 Justice Scalia, writing for the Court,
including Chief Justice Rehnquist, adopts the subordination argument, earlier
rejected in the Morrison conference, but not disclaimed in the majority opinion.
Scalia states his rule in abstract, categorical terms: "Whether one is an
'inferior' officer depends on whether he has a superior." 140 Edmond does not
purport to overrule Morrison. Instead, it characterizes Morrison as not
purporting to "set forth a definitive test" for what counts as an inferior
officer.
14 1
The fact, however, is that Edmond may have sub silentio overruled
Morrison on this point. There is substantial doubt whether under Scalia's
subordination formulation for "inferior officer" (a necessary, but not sufficient
condition) the independent counsel would still qualify as "inferior."' 142 This fact
is interesting because Chief Justice Rehnquist, the author of Morrison, assigned
Scalia the majority opinion in Edmond, fully aware of Scalia's earlier views
concerning subordination and his own prior rejection of it. Thus, Edmond is not
a case of Scalia craftily "pick[ing] the Court's pockets" on the separation of
powers. 143 It is the bank president opening the bank's vault wide and inviting
Ocean's Eleven to plunder it in broad daylight! It may have been that
Rehnquist reconsidered his views in Morrison, at least on the subordination
point. If that is the case, on that point at least, Morrison may represent a dead
end in Rehnquist's separation of powers jurisprudence, 144 a constitutional
misgiving, and as such it becomes easier to reconcile, through its abandonment,
with his other separation of powers cases.
137. Morrison v. Olson Conference Notes (Apr. 29, 1988), in THE HARRY A.
BLACKMUN PAPERS, Supreme Court File, 1918-1999, Box 507, Folder 8, No. 87-1279
(Library of Congress) (noting under Rehnquist's name "no buy SG's subordination argmt"
and under O'Connor's name "reject SG's subordinate proposition").
138. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 671-72 (1988) (Rehnquist, C.J.) (weighing
removability, limited duties, limited jurisdiction, and limited tenure to conclude independent
counsel was an "inferior officer").
139. 520 U.S. 651 (1997).
140. Id. at 662-63.
141. Id. at 661-62.
142. Nick Bravin, Note, Is Morrison v. Olson Still Good Law? The Court's New
Appointments Clause Jurisprudence, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 1103 (1998).
143. Elsewhere, one of the authors suggested that Scalia "picked the Court's pockets"
in Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 922-23 (1997), when as author of the majority
opinion Scalia adopted a unitary executive theory rejected in Morrison v. Olson. See Jay S.
Bybee, Printz, the Unitary Executive, and the Fire in the Trash Can: Has Justice Scalia
Picked the Court's Pocket?, 77 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 269, 288 (2001).
144. To be sure, nothing in Edmond calls into question Morrison's recharacterization
of Myers and Humphrey's Executor.
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Thus, apart from Morrison, which may be explainable in part as a
constitutional misgiving, Rehnquist seems to have pursued a generally
consistent approach to the separation of powers both as Associate Justice and
Chief Justice in the opinions that he authored. He focused on deciding the case
before him, such as in Dames & Moore, adopting the methodology of common
law adjudication and applying it to constitutional decisionmaking. This
approach is cautious and incrementalist, generally avoiding the pronouncement
of bright-line principles, an approach that permitted the political branches some
flexibility in arranging their relations. But where Rehnquist perceived the need,
as in American Textile, Industrial Union, and Chadha, he attempted to
reinforce the democratic process by forcing the legislature to make tough
policy decisions.
Those opinions Rehnquist did not author, however, may prove more
difficult to explain. As previously noted, Chief Justice Rehnquist lacked his
earlier vigor and vim as Associate Justice in the enforcement of the
nondelegation doctrine. In the next Part, we consider a possible explanation for
why Rehnquist's voting behavior may have changed on those opinions that he
did not author.
III. ANOTHER ANSWER TO THE RIDDLE: Two WILLIAM REHNQUISTS?
As an alternate way to explain the Court's constitutional jurisprudence, it
has been suggested that there have been two "Rehnquist Courts."' 145 We
examine the possibility that there may have been not only two Rehnquist
Courts, but also two William Rehnquists-Rehnquist the Associate Justice and
Rehnquist the Chief Justice. 146 On this account, as the dissenting "Lone
Ranger" Associate Justice, Rehnquist took a strong view of the separation of
powers. 147 As Chief Justice, with institutional incentives to obtain consensus
and vote with the majority, he assumed a less formal approach to the separation
of powers.
145. See generally Thomas W. Merrill, The Making of the Second Rehnquist Court: A
Preliminary Analysis, 47 ST. LouIs U. L.J. 569 (2003) (describing the second Rehnquist
Court as beginning in 1994). Another commentator has suggested there have been three
Rehnquist Courts. Linda Greenhouse, Foreword: The Third Rehnquist Court, in TIHE
REHNQUIST LEGACY xiii (Craig Bradley ed., 2006).
146. Of the sixteen Chief Justices confirmed by the Senate (John Rutledge, a recess
appointee, was never confirmed), only three have successfully been elevated from Associate
Justice to Chief Justice: William Rehnquist, Harlan Stone, and Edward White. Thus, their
tenures are natural experiments in how the institutional incentives of becoming Chief Justice
may change an Associate Justice's voting behavior.
147. R. Ted Cruz, In Memoriam: William H. Rehnquist, 119 HARv. L. REV. 10, 11
(2005) ("[I]n 1986, there is a sharp divide: from that point forward, each Term's volume of
collected opinions falls to one to two inches in width. That visual break was not the result of
a sudden lack of verbosity. Rather, it was a physical manifestation of Chief Justice
Rehnquist's understanding of the very different task assigned a Chief Justice. No longer was
his principal role to expound impassioned individual views; instead, it was to lead.").
1759
HeinOnline -- 58 Stan. L. Rev. 1759 2005-2006
STANFORD LAW REVIEW
Rehnquist, as Chief Justice, enjoyed the privilege of assigning the writing
of majority opinions to a particular Justice or himself when he voted with the
majority. Although his colleagues 148 and empirical evidence 149 confirm that
Rehnquist overall used the assignment function equitably and as a neutral tool
to promote efficiency, it may be that Rehnquist's own voting patterns changed
as a result of becoming Chief Justice. There is a potent incentive for a Chief
Justice, who enjoys the opinion assignment power, not to waste the opportunity
to shape the law by staking out ideologically pure opinions to which a majority
will not subscribe. Instead, a Chief Justice may forego perfect consistency for
an opportunity to control, either directly or indirectly, the writing of the
opinion. Thus, a Chief Justice will speak his mind less frequently by way of
concurrence or dissent in exchange for joining a majority and enjoying the
privilege of opinion assignment. A prominent former Rehnquist clerk has
suggested that the Chief Justice may have used this assignment function to
guide outcomes and may have, on occasion, assigned opinions to himself to
limit rationales ("damage control"). 150 On this account, the Chief Justice's
votes as a member of majorities may have, in some circumstances, been
strategic. 151 The phenomenon of strategic voting should cause legal scholars to
reassess whether or not undue weight has been given to one or two outlying
opinions, such as Morrison v. Olson, as merely reflecting a strategic vote made
under constraints rather than an expression ofjurisprudential significance.
What evidence supports this claim? First, Rehnquist was typical of prior
Chief Justices. Chief Justices typically vote 80% of the time with the
majority. 152 Rehnquist was no different. He voted some 81% of the time with
the majority during his first five terms as Chief.153 Second, and relatedly,
Rehnquist's instances of solo dissent and concurrence dropped precipitously
148. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, In Memoriam: William H. Rehnquist, 119 HARv. L. REv. 6
(2005) ("[O]f all the bosses I have had as lawyer, law teacher, and judge, Chief Justice
William Hubbs Rehnquist was hands down the fairest and most efficient."); Sandra Day
O'Connor, In Memoriam: William H. Rehnquist, 119 HARV. L. REv. 3, 5 (2005) ("My years
spent on a ranch taught me that expert horse riders let the horse know immediately who is in
control, but then guide the horse with loose reins and very seldom use the spurs. So it was
with our Chief. Efficiency was very important to him, but he guided us with loose reins and
used the spurs only rarely to get us up to speed with our work. His best weapon was his
assignment of opinions: a Justice behind schedule would simply receive fewer opinions to
write.").
149. Forrest Maltzman & Paul J. Wahlbeck, May It Please the Chief? Opinion
Assignments in the Rehnquist Court, 40 AM. J. POL. Sct. 421, 442 (1996); Forrest Maltzman
& Paul J. Wahlbeck, Opinion Assignment on the Rehnquist Court, 89 JUDICATURE 121
(2005).
150. Cruz, supra note 147, at 14-15.
151. Id. at 15; see also Linda Greenhouse, The Last Days of the Rehnquist Court: The
Rewards of Patience andPower, 45 ARIZ. L. REv. 251, 262 (2003) (characterizing Rehnquist
as more interested in the outcome than taking credit for it).
152. Harold J. Spaeth, Chief Justice Rehnquist: "Poster Child" for the Attitudinal
Model, 89 JUDICATURE 108, 114 (2005).
153. Id.
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during his Chief Justiceship. 154 Thus, it would be no surprise that Rehnquist
would not speak his mind on separation of powers in a concurrence or dissent
as he had done in Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American
Petroleum Institute and American Textile Manufacturers Institute, Inc. v.
Donovan. Our own rough count suggests Rehnquist had an even stronger
affinity for voting in the majority as Chief Justice on separation of powers
cases. In twenty-seven cases in which he participated as Associate Justice,
Rehnquist voted with the majority 65% of the time. By comparison, as Chief
Justice, Rehnquist voted with the majority almost 90% of the time (thirty-three
out of thirty-seven cases). Of course, there is a nonmutually exclusive,
alternative explanation: Rehnquist's Chief Justiceship also coincided with a
shift in the Court's personnel as Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas joined
the Court, and that change may have made it easier for Rehnquist to join a
majority.1 55
The institutional incentives of becoming Chief Justice may help explain the
evolving beast of Rehnquist's separation of powers jurisprudence. Generally, in
those cases he authored, Rehnquist's views on the separation of powers, both as
Associate Justice and Chief Justice, were consistent (with the exception of
Morrison, which we explained may have been later abandoned by Rehnquist
himself). However, where Rehnquist did not author the opinion, his votes may
not have reflected his first choice. Instead, the institutional incentives of being
Chief may have influenced his choice not to concur or dissent as often as when
he was Associate Justice, sacrificing some consistency where an outcome was
palatable or perhaps simply inevitable.
CONCLUSION
We have suggested that Rehnquist's views on the separation of powers are
consistent in one sense: they reflect an inductive case-by-case, common law
approach to constitutional adjudication. Rehnquist looked to precedent and
historical practice to inform his reading of the constitutional text and, for
Rehnquist, precedent and practice are as much the law as the text of the
Constitution itself. This pattern is generally consistent in those opinions that
Rehnquist authored. Even the notable exception of Morrison v. Olson might be
explained too, if one considers it a case that Rehnquist later came to regret and
allowed Scalia to revisit in part in Edmond.
Of course, Rehnquist's separation of powers votes in cases where he did
not author the opinion but simply joined might not be as tidily explained as
those majority opinions he wrote himself. Rehnquist concurred separately and
dissented less often as Chief Justice than as Associate Justice. It may be that
154. Id.; see also Nancy Maveety, The Era of the Choral Court, 89 JUDICATURE 138,
142 (2005) (noting fewer concurrences).
155. Spaeth, supra note 152, at 110.
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Rehnquist's role of Chief Justice changed his voting patterns from his early
days as a dissenting Associate Justice. Thus, to explain Rehnquist's separation
of power opinions and his votes, it might be necessary to resort to both the
practical and institutional realities of being the Chief Justice as well as his
jurisprudential principles.
Is there a simpler, hidden principle that unifies Rehnquist's separation of
powers opinions and votes? As the Sphinx-like Chief might answer: "That's for
me to know and you to find out."
156
156. Quotation of the Day, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2005, at A2 (quoting Chief Justice
Rehnquist "to reporters, on rumors that he would retire").
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